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The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for the 
Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior 
Sexual Conduct 
Christopher B. Reid 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to con-
front witnesses against them. 1 The primary means for exercising this 
right is through cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses.2 
The defendant's right to cross-examine, however, is not without limits; 
in particular, there are limits on the subject matter and scope of the 
cross-examination. 3 In the area of sex crimes, the conflict between the 
right to cross-examine and the right of sexual assault victims to keep 
private their prior sexual history brought to the forefront the issue of 
limitations on the scope of cross-examination. A nationwide debate 
over this issue during the 1970s resulted in the enactment of a "rape 
shield" statute in virtually every state in the country.4 The typical 
rape shield statute limits the ability of the defendant to question the 
prosecuting witness about prior sexual conduct. 5 The statutes repre-
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. This right also applies to state prosecutions through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
2. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). ("Confrontation means more than being al-
lowed to confront the witness physically. 'Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold 
that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.' ") (quoting Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). . 
3. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) ("[T]he right to present relevant testimony is not 
without limitation. The right 'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process.'") (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 
(1973)). 
4. Currently 48 states, the military, and the federal government have enacted rape shield 
statutes. The remaining two states, Arizona and Utah, have judicial decisions that accomplish 
the same goal by excluding prior sexual conduct evidence in general. For a complete citation list 
of these statutes and decisions, see Kim Steinmetz, Note, State v. Oliver: Children With a Past; 
The Admissibility of the Victim's Prior Sexual Experience in Child Molestation Cases, 31 ARiz. L. 
REV. 677, 680 nn.18-19 (1989). 
5. For example, the federal rape shield statute reads in relevant part: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is 
accused of [the federal offense of rape], reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual 
behavior of an alleged victim of such offense is not admissible. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, [in such a case] evidence of a victim's 
past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless 
such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is -
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(l) and (c)(2) and is constitutionally 
required to be admitted; or 
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of -
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the accused 
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sented a legislative judgment, one that rejected widespread thinking, 6 
that a woman's prior sexual conduct was of limited relevance to the 
defense of a sexual assault charge. 
Although the rape shield statute began as a response to the wide-
spread admissibility of a woman's prior sexual conduct for the pur-
poses of showing consent to a sexual act, the courts soon extended the 
statute's reach to child molestation cases. 7 In these cases, the courts 
excluded any evidence of a prior molestation of the child, even though 
upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the 
source of semen or injury; or 
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon the issue 
of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which such 
offense is alleged. 
(c)(l) [If the defendant] intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific in-
stances of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, [the defendant must make a written 
motion to offer such evidence to the court not later than fifteen days before the start of the 
trial. The defendant must also serve the motion upon all parties and the alleged victim.] 
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written offer of 
proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence described in subdivi-
sion (b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is admis-
sible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer 
relevant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of rule 104, if the relevancy of the evi-
dence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers 
scheduled for such a purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition 
of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue. 
(3) if the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph (2) that the 
evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such 
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the 
trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and 
areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined. 
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means sexual behavior 
other than the sexual behavior with respect to which [the federal offense of rape is alleged.] 
FED. R. Evm. 412. For an in-depth examination and comparison of rape shield statutes 
throughout the country, see Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal 
Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 10 MINN. L. REv. 763 (1986). 
6. Professor Harriett Galvin states: 
Rape-shield statutes were primarily directed against the second common-law usage of victim 
character evidence. That usage was based on the notion that women who had engaged in 
sexual intercourse outside of marriage had violated societal norms and therefore possessed 
the character flaw of unchastity, that is, a propensity to engage in nonmarital sexual activity. 
Accordingly, a defendant accused of forcible rape who professed innocence on the ground 
that the complainant consented to the sexual act in question was permitted to prove the 
complainant's "unchaste character." From that proof, the jury was permitted to infer that 
such an unchaste woman was more likely to have consented to sexual intercourse on the 
occasion in question ..•. This evidentiary theory is a straightforward application of the 
exception to the general rule prohibiting character evidence - it permits evidence of the 
victim's character to prove conduct, namely consent. 
Galvin, supra note S, at 783-84 (citations omitted). 
7. See Steinmetz, supra note 4, at 685 (''The general consensus of the courts is that rape 
shield statutes do apply to cases involving minor victims."). The most glaring exception to this 
rule is State v. Carver, 678 P.2d 842 (Wash. App. 1984), in which the court distinguished evi-
dence of the prior sexual abuse of a child from evidence of the prior sexual conduct of a rape 
victim, which Washington's rape shield statute prohibited. The court stated: "The evidence 
proffered in this case does not fit within the concepts and purposes of the rape shield statute. , •• 
[T]he evidence sought to be admitted here was prior sexual abuse, not misconduct, of a victim." 
678 P.2d at 843. 
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consent was never an issue in those cases. 8 Within the past ten years, 
however, defendants have developed a new theory to support the ad-
missibility of a child's prior sexual conduct in a child molestation case 
in spite of the prohibitions of the rape shield statute. This Note names 
this relatively new strategy the sexual innocence inference theory of 
admissibility. 9 
The sexual innocence inference refers to the thought process a jury 
follows when it hears a young child testify about sexual acts and mat-
ters that reveal an understanding of such acts beyond the capacity 
likely at his or her age. A jury is likely to assume that because the 
child is so young, he or she must be innocent of sexual matters. 
Shocked by the child's display on the witness stand, the jury may then 
infer that the child could have acquired such knowledge only if the 
charged offense of child molestation is true. 10 To rebut this inference, 
8. In general, the victim's consent is never a. defense in a criminal prosecution because of the 
notion that a crime is an offense against the entire society and not just the single victim. 1 
WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.11, at 687 
(1986). Some crimes, however, are defined so that the victim's lack of consent is an element of 
the crime. In these cases, the victim's consent will prevent an element of the crime from having 
occurred; in that sense, consent will function as a defense. Id. § 5.11, at 688. Conversely, a child 
molestation statute never makes the child victim's lack of consent an element of the crime. See, 
e.g., IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-42-4-3 (West 1986): 
Sec. 3. (a) A person who, with a child under twelve (12) years of age, performs or sub-
mits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct commits child molesting, a Class B 
felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if it is committed by using or threatening 
the use of deadly force, or while armed with a deadly weapon, or if it results in serious 
bodily injury. 
(e) It is a defense that the accused person reasonably believed that the child was sixteen 
(16) years of age or older at the time of the conduct. 
(f) It is a defense that the child is or has ever been married. 
9. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire generally receives credit for first tackling this issue 
in State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457 (N.H. 1981). See People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 
1982). InArenda, the Michigan Supreme Court calls the sexual innocence inference theory "in-
genious," 330 N.W.2d at 817, and notes that Howard is the only case known to have faced the 
issue at that time. 330 N.W.2d at 818 n.8. It appears, however, that the Maine Supreme Court 
handled the identical issue in 1979. See State v. Davis, 406 A.2d 900 (Me. 1979). The Davis 
court found that evidence of the victim's "undue curiosity regarding the human sexual organs, as 
more particularly manifested by a preoccupation to pull down, or have pulled down, the pants of 
other people," must be admitted to prevent the jury from thinking that the victim was "too 
innocent of sexual matters to think up the kind of sexual conduct she had described unless it was 
real and she had actually experienced it." 406 A.2d at 901-02. 
10. A majority of courts addressing the sexual innocence inference theory agrees that a jury 
might make such an inference, but the courts cannot agree about how to determine when the jury 
is susceptible to such an inference for the purpose of judging the admissibility of the prior sexual 
conduct evidence. See State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Ariz. 1988); People v. Rice, 709 
P.2d 67, 68-69 (Colo. App. 1985); State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706, 708 (Me. 1989); Common-
wealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 
691, 695-96 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn. 1986); 
Woodruffv. State, 518 So. 2d 669, 671-72 (Miss. 1988); Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 
(Nev. 1985); State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981); State v. Budis, 580 A.2d 283, 290 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), ajfd., 593 A.2d 784 (1991); State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 
325, 334-35 (Wis. 1990). 
At least two courts simply do not believe that juries make such inferences. See State v. 
Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 1984); People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982). 
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a defendant would like to introduce evidence of the child's prior sexual 
conduct, including a prior molestation, to show that the child could 
have acquired sexual knowledge from prior abuse rather than from the 
charged encounter.11 The evidence demonstrates an alternative source 
for the child's sexual knowledge. 12 This, in tum, permits the defend-
ant to argue credibly that the child had the capacity to fabricate the 
charge against him.13 
Thus, a court attempting to decide whether such evidence is ad-
missible faces a difficult problem. Under the Sixth Amendment, the 
defendant may cross-examine the child and, to the extent that evi-
dence of a prior molestation might prevent a jury from making the 
sexual innocence inference, the cross-examination represents an attack 
on the credibility of the witness which has traditionally been permissi-
ble. On the other hand, the rape shield statute, by its terms, excludes 
the evidence. The goal of this Note is to provide a rational means of 
resolving this quandary. 
To aid in the resolution of this problem, this Note makes a number 
of assumptions. First, in light of the significant number of cases ac-
knowledging the theory,14 as well as some sparse empirical data which 
lend it limited support,15 this Note assumes that juries do indeed infer 
sexual innocence, and focuses on the more pressing problem of deter-
At least one court has noted evidence that tends to demonstrate that juries do make the sexual 
innocence inference: 
In the affidavit supporting appellant-defendant's motion for a new trial in the proceed-
ings below, it was asserted that Juror No. 1, Richard L. Linton, after the verdict was ren-
dered, stated to both counsel for the state and the appellant that during the jury's 
deliberations "the question was posed among the jurors why a girl of such a young age 
would know of such sexual acts unless they had, in fact, occurred as alleged." 
Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 n.4 (Nev. 1985). 
11. See, e.g., Oliver, 160 P.2d at 1076; Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708; Rujfen, 501 N.E.2d at 687. 
12. See, e.g., Oliver, 160 P.2d at 1076-77; Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708; Rujfen, 501 N.E.2d at 
687. 
13. See, e.g., Oliver, 760 P.2d at 1076; Howard, 426 A.2d at 462; Budis, 580 A.2d at 291. 
14. See supra note 10. 
15. At least one study argues that juries might make the sexual innocence inference in certain 
situations. Gail S. Goodman et al., When a Child Takes the Stand, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 
38 (1987) (hypothesizing that jurors may be more likely to believe a younger child because such a 
child does not have the sexual knowledge to be able to fabricate a detailed sexual molestation 
charge); See also Bruce E. Bohlman, The High Cost of Constitutional Rights in Child Abuse Cases 
-Is the Price Worth Paying?, 66 N.D. L. REV. 579, 582 (1990) ("[The Goodman study, supra,] 
concluded that while credibility usually increases as the age of the child increases, the opposite is 
true for children testifying in sexual abuse cases. The study found jurors are more prone to 
believe a younger child because the young child does not have sufficient experience or knowledge 
to fabricate a report of sexual activity.") (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 582 n.21 ("The 
literature is in the developmental stage on the issue of credibility of children, and one can cer-
tainly state that children's credibility is not a subject on which there is universal agreement. As 
in every case, the credibility of each witness is for the trier of fact to determine."); HARRY 
KAI.VEN •. JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 170 (1966) ("[I]n a series of child sex 
cases, the suggestion is that the jury has a distinctive tendency to believe the accused adult as 
against the accusing young child ...• [This suggestion is doubtful.] One would expect that in 
these conflicts the choice between child and adult is extremely close, sometimes falling one way, 
sometimes the other. And indeed this is the case."). 
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mining when they draw the inference and what should be done in re-
sponse. Second, this Note assumes a limited fact situation. In the 
typical case envisioned by this Note, a child has accused an adult of 
some kind of sexual molestation such as a simple fondling or a more 
severe sexual assault. At some time prior to the charged assault, the 
child suffered an instance of sexual abuse, which need not have been 
inflicted by the defendant in the present case. This Note also assumes 
that other methods of introducing the child's prior sexual conduct into 
evidence have failed. For example, this Note assumes there is no 
physical evidence of the present assault; if there were, and if the prior 
sexual conduct were sufficiently recent, the defendant might persuade 
a judge to admit the prior sexual conduct evidence under the rape 
shield statute to demonstrate that the defendant is not the only poten-
tial source of the semen or injury.16 This Note also assumes that the 
child's prior sexual conduct does not tend to demonstrate that the 
child may be biased against the defendant.17 Under such circum-
stances, the sexual innocence inference theory is essentially the defend-
ant's last hope. 
Given these assumptions, this Note argues that the admissibility of 
a child's prior sexual conduct to rebut the sexual innocence inference 
can be effectively determined by reference to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence governing relevance and prejudice, both of which are virtually 
identical to their state evidentiary law counterparts.18 This Note con-
tends that many state courts today err on the side of the defendant by 
16. See FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2)(A); infra note 34. 
17. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam). In Olden. the criminal 
defendant had been charged with kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy. The defendant argued 
that the victim had consented to the sexual acts. To support that argument, the defendant 
wished to present evidence that the victim had an ongoing sexual relationship with the defend-
ant's half-brother; such evidence, the defendant argued, indicated that the victim had a motive to 
lie to preserve that relationship with the defendant's half-brother. The Court summarized this 
argument: "[The defendant] has consistently asserted that he and [the victim] engaged in con-
sensual sexual acts and that [the victim]- out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with [the 
defendant's half-brother] - lied when she told [the defendant's half-brother] she had been raped 
and has continued to lie since." 488 U.S. at 232. The Court held that the trial court's refusal to 
allow the defendant to pursue this theory on cross-examination violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights. 488 U.S. at 233. In sum, "[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examina-
tion designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness .•.. " 488 U.S. at 
231 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). Thll$, a criminal defendant 
might be able to introduce the child's prior sexual conduct if the evidence indicated how the 
child might be biased against the defendant. 
18. This Note often refers to relevance and prejudice principles as a shorthand reference to 
the principles found in the Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 respectively. Rule 401 states: 
" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. Although substan-
tial variations exist throughout the states in the rape shield area, the great majority of states have 
relevance and prejudice provisions similar to these federal rules. See generally 1 GREGORY P. 
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admitting prior sexual conduct evidence when it is either irrelevant, 
overly prejudicial, or both. Part I briefly traces the constitutional de-
velopment of the defendant's right to cross-examine and its relation-
ship to the relevance and prejudice provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Part II outlines the current responses of state courts to the 
sexual innocence inference theory. Part III argues that by applying 
standard relevance and prejudice concepts embodied in the federal 
rules, courts can determine admissibility in a more logical manner. 
This Note concludes that state courts defer too readily to defendants 
in these admissibility decisions and that they can usually exclude this 
evidence without violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. 
I. THE OPERATION OF THE RAPE SHIELD STATUTE AND THE 
RIGHT To CROSS-EXAMINE IN A CHILD MOLESTATION 
CASE 
This Part analyzes the operation of rape shield statutes in child 
molestation cases in an effort to defuie more precisely the conflict be-
tween the defendant's right to cross-examine and the interest of the 
prosecution and judicial system in keeping highly prejudicial prior sex-
ual conduct evidence out of a criminal trial. Section I.A focuses on 
the prototypical rape shield statute, Federal Rule of Evidence 412,19 to 
determine exactly what effect such a statute has on the right to cross-
examine. Section I.B briefly traces the constitutional development of 
the right to cross-examine by discussing relevant U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions. The first two sections conclude that the Constitution enti-
tles a defendant to present relevant evidence so long as the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Section I.C.1 
then examines the meaning of relevance in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Section I.C.2 follows with an evaluation of the prejudice prin-
ciples of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and their relationship to 
relevance. This Part concludes that a defendant seeking to introduce 
evidence must show its relevance before invoking any constitutional 
rights, and that a trial court may constitutionally exclude relevant evi-
dence 4i certain circumstances. 
A. The Rape Shield Statute 
Several courts in child molestation cases have discussed rape shield 
statutes at some point in their opinions. Some courts resolved the sex-
ual innocence inference issue by looking only at the rape shield stat-
JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN TIIE 
STATES (1987). 
19. See supra note 5 (quoting text of Rule 412). 
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ute.20 Others referred to the statute to support their reasoning.21 This 
section explores the purpose of the typical rape shield statute in an 
effort to discover how it should operate in child molestation cases. 
The rape shield statute was a legislative response to an assumption 
made by many courts when hearing rape cases that "most women 
were virtuous by nature and that an unchaste woman must therefore 
have an unus~al character fiaw."22 This flaw caused the "unchaste" 
woman to consent to sex in situations in which "normal" women 
would not have consented.23 Thus, the courts would allow the defend-
ant to introduce into evidence prior sexual acts to show the woman's 
tendency to consent. 24 Proponents of the rape shield statute argued 
that this practice discouraged women from reporting rapes for fear of 
being humiliated at trial by attorneys delving into their sexual histo-
ries. 25 Further, by the 1970s, the very premise underlying this as-
sumption was eroding; society no longer considered the fact that a 
woman had sexual relations outside of marriage a character fiaw.26 
Drafting a legislative solution, however, proved difficult; even the pro-
ponents of the rape shield legislation agreed that prior sexual conduct 
evidence was relevant in certain narrowly circumscribed situations.27 
20. See, e.g., People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982); State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 
457 (N.H. 1981); see also infra sections II.A and 11.B. 
21. See, e.g., State v. Budis, 580 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), ajfd., 593 A.2d 
784 (1991); State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1990); see also infra section 11.C. 
22. J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 547-48 (1980). 
23. Id. at 548. 
24. Id. 
25. Galvin, supra note 5, at 794-95. Professor Galvin writes: 
If the complainant's version nonetheless withstood official scrutiny and the case proceeded 
to trial, the common-law rules permitting proof of the complainant's sexual past resulted in 
nothing less than character-assassination in open court. The catch-phrase "victim on trial" 
captures the essence of this criticism. This focus on the complainant's sex life led to insinua-
tions by defense attorneys that she "enjoyed" the sexual act in question and that she "asked 
for it" by her appearance or conduct. Cross-examination often delved not only into the 
complainant's chastity or lack thereof but also into matters such as her use of contracep-
tives, attendance at nightspots, adulterous relationships, illegitimate offspring, and so on. 
The image of a typical rape trial put forth by reformers was that of an inquisition into the 
moral worth of the complainant to determine if she were deserving of the full protection of 
the law. 
Id. at 794-95 (footnotes omitted). In child molestation cases, however, this privacy rationale is 
not as persuasive. See infra section 111.B.1. 
26. Galvin, supra note 5, at 798-99 ("Because the decision 'to engage in consensual 
nonmarital sexual activity is no longer a decision to defy conventional norms, the behavior is 
'character-neutral' and does not support the inference 'if she strayed once, she'll stray again.'") 
(footnotes omitted). 
27. Professor Galvin states: 
Even the most ardent reformers acknowledged the high probative value of past sexual con-
duct in at least two instances. The first is when the defendant claims consent and establishes 
prior consensual sexual relations between himself and the complainant. The second is when 
the defendant denies altogether engaging in the sexual act in question and proves specific 
sexual acts between the complainant and another man at the relevant time, such proof suffic-
ing to prove an alternative explanation for the physical consequences of the alleged rape. 
Id. at 807 (footnotes omitted). 
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The resulting rape shield statutes "tend to the opposite extreme of the 
old rule of automatic admissibility: presumptive inadmissibility."28 
The rape shield statute thus represents a legislative judgment that 
prior sexual conduct evidence is generally irrelevant and too prejudi-
cial to admit, with certain exceptions. 
The Sixth Amendment, however, gives the defendant the right to 
cross-examine.29 The rape shield statute clearly limits that right. But 
a legislative act cannot override a constitutional mandate; conse-
quently, a state should not be able to limit that right simply by declar-
ing certain types of evidence to be irrelevant. 30 Thus two 
commentators argue: 
If the Constitution assures no more than the right of a defendant to pres-
ent evidence that the state has determined to be relevant, then the de-
fendant cannot complain of a state law changing the rules to restrict 
· certain types of evidence. The issue has been put to rest by the Supreme 
Court. Because the ability of the accused to present testimony is 
grounded in a constitutional right, a federal constitutional standard ap-
plies .... To say that a state has changed the traditional law and de-
clared evidence irrelevant thus does not answer the constitutional 
question. 31 
In light of the conclusion that the rape shield statute cannot exclude 
constitutionally protected evidence, this section attempts to determine 
how the statute should operate in child molestation cases when the 
defendant asserts the sexual innocence inference theory.32 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 states a basic presumption that the 
28. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 22, at 551. 
29. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI; see supra note 2. 
30. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 22, at 555 ("Clearly, the State could not constitutionally 
define all cross-examination as irrelevant without running afoul of the sixth amendment. The 
question, then, is whether sexual history evidence may be singled out and made inadmissible.") 
(footnote omitted). 
31. Id. at 559-60 (footnotes omitted). The authors support their statements with citations to 
Supreme Court cases. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967), the Court stated, "it 
could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the [Confrontation] clause if it made all 
defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law." The authors also drew support 
from Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), in which the Court held that a state law prohibiting 
the publication of a juvenile offender's record must bend to the defendant's right to cross-ex-
amine and attack the witness' credibility based on that record to show a possible bias against the 
defendant. 
32. In the typical sexual innocence inference situation, the defendant seeks to explain the 
child's developed sexual knowledge by introducing evidence that the child has been molested in 
the past. This evidence will undoubtedly contain a description of the prior acts of molestation 
inflicted upon the child. Because the great majority of states consider the acts of molestation 
within the meaning of"prior sexual conduct," the rape shield statute will apply. See supra note 7 
and accompanying text. One can argue that the rape shield statute was not aimed at and should 
not be applicable to child molestation cases. See, e.g., State v. Carver, 678 P.2d 842, 843 (Wash. 
App. 1984). However, because the vast majority of cases have considered the statute applicable, 
this Note forgoes debating whether the statute should be involved in child molestation cases and 
focuses on resolving the conflict between this accepted application of rape shield statutes and the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine. 
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victim's past sexual conduct is not admissible. 33 The defendant can, 
however, rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the evidence 
falls into one of three exceptions. First, the evidence is admissible if it 
indicates that another person was the source of the semen found in or 
on the child or the cause of the injury suffered by the child. 34 Second, 
the evidence is admissible if it is ·offered to show a pattern of consen-
sual sexual behavior between the victim and the defendant. 35 Because 
a child's consent is irrelevant to the crime of child molestation, 36 the 
trial judge should quickly reject this theory of admissibility. Third, 
the court must admit the evidence if it "is constitutionally required to 
be admitted."37 This exception is the last hope of the defendant. Be-
cause this exception requires a constitutional analysis, the rape shield 
statute on its own does not and cannot resolve the problem presented 
by the sexual innocence inference theory of admissibility.38 
Despite the above analysis, the rape shield statute is not meaning-
less when applied to the sexual innocence inference theory. The judge 
will usually have discretion to exclude evidence whose prejudicial ef-
fect substantially outweighs its probative value under Rule 403; but 
that rule does not require the judge to exclude such evidence. 39 The 
rape shield statute forces the judge to exclude the evidence when it is 
constitutionally permissible to do so.40 Consequently, it is necessary 
33. FED. R. Ev10. 412. 
34. FED. R. Ev10. 412(b)(2)(A). This Note addresses only cases in which there is no medical 
evidence of molestation such as collected semen or physical injury. If there is such evidence, 
evidence of prior molestation may be relevant to show that the defendant is not responsible for 
the semen or injury. Obviously, if there is medical evidence, the defendant will not normally rely 
upon so ethereal a theory as the sexual innocence inference but will instead base his foundation 
for admissibility on the semen or injury exception to Rule 412. In fact, "physical injury in child 
sexual abuse cases is rare . . . . The most commonly reported type of child sexual abuse is 
nonviolent genital manipulation, which would rarely cause any physical damage." L. Matthew 
Duggan III et al., The Credibility of Children as Witnesses in a Simulated Child Sex Abuse Trial, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TEsTIMONY 71, 73 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989). 
35. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B). 
36. See supra note 8. 
37. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(l). 
38. Some commentators and courts say that without such a "constitutionally required" ex-
ception, a rape shield statute may operate to exclude evidence in violation of the defendant's 
rights. See, e.g., Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 22, at 545 ("To the extent that a defendant in a 
rape case is categorically prevented from offering types of evidence that other criminal defend-
ants may offer, his sixth amendment rights are violated."); see also State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 
457 (N.H. 1981): 
Strictly construed, our State rape shield statute precludes an accused from making any 
showing that the victim's prior sexual activity has a bearing on any of these factors .••. [I]n 
order to uphold the constitutionality of [the rape shield statute], we hold that a defendant 
.•. must, upon motion, be given an opportunity to demonstrate that due process requires 
the admission of such evidence because the probative value in the context of that particular 
case outweighs its prejudicial effect on the prosecutrix. 
426 A.2d at 460-61. 
39. See infra section I.C.2. 
40. The effect of Rule 412 is significant in this respect. As one commentator notes, when 
Rule 403 is applied and "the balance is close between probative force and one or more 
counterweights, the federal rule favors admissibility." GRAHAM c. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION 
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to determine when the Constitution permits a court to exclude prior 
sexual conduct evidence and when such evidence may not be excluded 
because it is "constitutionally required." The Supreme Court's analy-
sis of the Confrontation Clause provides the answer. 
B. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment grants to the criminal defendant the right 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him."41 The Supreme 
Court has held that this right "means more than being allowed to con-
front the witness physically. 'Our cases construing the [Confronta-
tion] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of 
cross-examination.' "42 Because cross-examination is an important 
tool in enforcing the right to confront, any limits placed on cross-ex-
amination require a constitutional analysis. 
The Supreme Court has determined, however, that the right to 
cross-examine is not absolute. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 43 the Court 
made clear that "[i]n the exercise of this right, the accused, as is re-
quired of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure 
and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the as-
certainment of guilt and innocence."44 The Chambers Court indicated 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence can place constitutionally permissi-
ble limits on the right to cross-examine. 45 
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states that relevant evidence is ad-
missible, with some exceptions, but irrelevant evidence is not admissi-
ble. 46 In light of the Court's statement in Chambers and the fact that 
the Supreme Court has never read the Sixth Amendment "to mean 
that the defendant has the right to introduce whatever he wants,"47 
the defendant clearly has no right to present irrelevant evidence, 
whether through direct or cross-examination. The Court implied as 
much in Rock v. Arkansas, 48 when it stated, "[T]he right to present 
relevant testimony is not without limitation.''49 In sum, the Court has 
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 2.5, at 40 (West 1987) (footnote omitted). When Rule 412 is 
applied, however, "[i]f the balance between probative force and prejudice is roughly equal, Rule 
412 commands that the evidence in question be excluded." Id. § 5.9, at 144. 
41. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
42. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 
418 (1965)). 
43. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
44. 410 U.S. at 302. 
45. 410 U.S. at 295; see infra text accompanying note 50. 
46. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
47. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 22, at 558 ("Rather, [the defendant's] right is limited to 
evidence having some probative value."). 
48. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
49. 483 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added). 
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ruled that evidence must be relevant before its exclusion can violate 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
Once a trial judge finds the evidence relevant, the constitutional 
inquiry is not complete. As the Court stated in Chambers, the right to 
confront and cross-examine "may, in appropriate cases, bow to ac-
commodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."so 
The Court discussed the constitutionality of allowing limits on this 
right in Delaware v. Van Arsdall: s1 
It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense 
counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the 
contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examina-
tion based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant. s2 
Van Arsdall made clear that relevance was not the sole factor in a 
Sixth Amendment inquiry; the trial court was free to consider the 
other traditional reasons for excluding evidence. In doing so, the 
Court was simply elaborating upon its year-old ruling in Delaware v. 
Fensterer. s3 In Fensterer, the Court said, "Generally speaking, the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-ex-
amination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."s4 The Court envi-
sioned a confrontation right that a trial court, exercising its reasonable 
judgment, could limit for certain purposes. As the Court noted in Van 
Arsdall, potential prejudice resulting from the admission of a certain 
piece of evidence is a factor the trial judge can consider in determining 
its admissibility. Because the trial judge has such power, clearly the 
judge can force a party to proceed along an alternate path in its at-
tempt to offer evidence, as Fensterer suggests. As long as the trial 
court permits a party to express a relevant point, the trial court may 
reasonably limit or adjust the manner or angle of questioning the party 
employs during cross-examination to make that point. 
The Supreme Court recently resolved any doubts about the consti-
tutionality of this limit on the Sixth Amendment. In Michigan v. Lu-
cas, ss the Court stated: "To the extent that [the rape shield statute] 
operates to prevent a criminal defendant from presenting relevant evi-
dence, the defendant's ability to confront adverse witnesses and pres-
ent a defense is diminished. This does not necessarily render the 
50. 410 U.S. at 295. 
51. 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
52. 475 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added). 
53. 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam). 
54. 474 U.S. at 20. 
55. 111 s. Ct. 1743 (1991). 
838 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:827 
statute unconstitutional."56 This ruling supports the argument of two 
commentators, who described the right to cross-examine in the follow-
ing manner: "[T]he [S]ixth [A]mendment guarantees that a criminal 
defendant will be able to introduce any evidence probative of a mate-
rial issue, unless the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect of the testimony."57 To judge whether an evidentiary item is 
constitutionally required, and consequently whether a rape shield stat-
ute may exclude it, 58 initially one must assess the item's relevance and 
probative value, and then its prejudicial effect. 
C. The Balance Between Relevance and Prejudice 
1. The Relevance Principle 
Any examination of the concept of relevance should begin with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less prob-
able than it would be without the evidence. "59 
Rule 401 contains two requirementS: "(l) The evidence must be 
probative of the proposition it is offered to prove, and (2) the proposi-
tion to be proved must be one that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action."60 Determining whether the proposition to be 
proved is a fact of consequence within the meaning of Rule 401 gener-
ally requires looking at "the substantive law [at issue] within the 
framework of the pleadings."61 But regardless of the substantive law 
involved, "the termfact of consequence includes facts bearing circum-
stantially upon the evaluation of the probative value to be given to 
other evidence in the case, including the credibility of witnesses. " 62 
56. 111 S. Ct. at 1746. 
57. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 22, at 560. 
58. The rape shield statute itself is essentially a judgment that prior sexual conduct evidence 
is relevant only in certain situations, and often prejudicial. Consequently, it seems intuitive to 
require the defendant to prove that the evidence is relevant and that its probative value outweighs 
its prejudicial elfect before the court may admit the evidence: 
The text of Rule 412(c)(3) provides that the accused must establish that the probative value 
of the evidence outweighs solely the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403 on the other hand 
provides for admissibility of relevant evidence unless the opponent of the evidence estab-
lishes that the trial court concerns enumerated substantially outweigh the probative value. 
Thus Rule 412(c)(3) alters the content, standard and allocation of the burden established in 
Rule 403. 
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 412.1, at 305 (3d ed. 1991). 
59. FED. R. Evm. 401. Rule 402 provides that only relevant evidence is admissible: "All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. 
Evm. 402. 
60. United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). 
61. GRAHAM, supra note 58, § 401.1, at 144 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
62. Id. § 401.1, at 145 (footnotes omitted). 
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As noted in the Introduction, the sexual innocence inference is es-
sentially a judgment of the child's credibility;63 the jury will give more 
weight to the child's testimony if it infers that the child could only 
have the sexual knowledge she demonstrates in her testimony if the 
charged offense has occurred. 64 Thus, the source of the child's knowl-
edge is a fact of consequence if the child demonstrates sexual knowl-
edge beyond her years. 65 To complete a showing of relevance, 
however, the defendant must still demonstrate that his evidence makes 
it more probable that the child obtained her sexual knowledge from a 
prior incident. Although this is not a very rigorous test, 66 there are 
situations in which evidence of the child's prior sexual conduct fails to 
pass the test. 67 Once relevance is established, the trial judge must 
weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect before admitting 
the evidence. 68 
2. The Prejudice Principle 
The Constitution does not require that all relevant evidence be ad-
mitted. 69 The trial judge, therefore, must have some method of deter-
63. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13. 
64. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also GRAHAM, supra note 58, § 607.4, at 
431 (''The capacity and actuality of a witness' perception, his ability to record and remember 
sense impressions, and his ability to narrate are relevant to an assessment of the weight to be 
given a witness' testimony. Each of these areas is a proper subject of cross-examination.") (foot-
note omitted). 
65. The child's source of knowledge is only a fact of consequence if the jury makes the sexual 
innocence inference. The jury only makes the sexual innocence inference if the child demon-
strates sexual knowledge beyond her years. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 
691 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). In Rathbum, the court found that a child witness must demonstrate 
"knowledge of sexual matters beyond his or her years" before any sexual innocence inference by 
the jury may be presumed. 532 N.E.2d at 696. In applying the rule to the facts of the case, the 
court held that a 13-year-old victim had not demonstrated sexual knowledge beyond her years 
when she used the terms "penis," ''butt," "hard," and "rubbing" in her testimony. 532 N.E.2d 
at 696; see also State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071 (Ariz. 1988): 
We believe that if an accused raises the defense of fabrication, and if the minor victim is of 
such tender years that a jury might infer that the only way the victim could testify in detail 
about the alleged molestation is because the defendant had in fact sexually abused the vic-
tim, then evidence of the victim's prior sexual history is relevant to rebut such an inference. 
760 P.2d at 1077. 
Thus, in determining that the child's source of knowledge is a fact of consequence, the court, 
and not the jury, must reach the conclusion that the child has demonstrated sexual knowledge 
unusual for his or her age. 
66. One commentator has noted: 
[The trial judge] must exercise broad discretion in drawing on his own experience in the 
affairs of mankind in evaluating the probabilities upon which relevancy depends. The con-
cept of logical relevancy employed in Rule 401 must be kept separate from issues of suffi-
ciency of evidence for any purpose such as to satisfy a burden of production. "A brick is not 
a wall" - relevancy is the brick, sufficiency is the wall. Thus minimal logical relevancy is 
all that is required. 
GRAHAM, supra note 58, § 401.1, at 142 (quoting EDWARD w. CLEARY ET AL., McCoRMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 543 (3d ed. 1984)) (footnotes omitted). 
67. See infra section III.A. 
68. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
69. See supra section I.B. 
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mining which relevant evidence to admit. Federal Rule 403 supplies 
that standard: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jucy, or by consid-
eration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence. "70 If the trial judge determines that the evidence is 
prejudicial, the judge then must balance the probative value of the evi-
dence against the prejudicial effect its admission would have on the 
proceedings. 71 
In deciding whether to exclude evidence, the trial judge should 
also consider the availability of other means of proof. 72 If the judge 
decides to allow other means of proof, the judge should be satisfied 
that this other, less prejudicial evidence has the same potential to 
prove the case as the more prejudicial evidence did. 73 Moreover, when 
70. FED. R. Evm. 403. 
71. Rule 403 requires the judge to engage in 
a conscious process of balancing the costs of the evidence against its benefits. Unless the 
judge concludes that the probative worth of the evidence is "substantially outweighed" by 
one or more of the countervailing factors, there is no discretion to exclude; the evidence 
must be admitted. If, on the other hand, the balance goes against probative worth, the judge 
is not required to exclude the evidence but he or she "may" do so. In other words, the 
process of balancing is a prerequisite to the exercise of discretion but it is not a formula for 
its exercise; the rule presupposes a two-step process - balancing, then the discretionary 
judgment. 
22 CHARI.Es A. WRIGHT & KENNE11i W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACI'ICE AND PROCE· 
DURE § 5214, at 263-64 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
72. "The availability of other means of p~oof may also be an appropriate factor." FED. R. 
Evm. 403 advisory committee's note. 
73. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 
220, 250-51 (1976): 
If other evidence is available, the consequences of totally excluding, rather than attempting 
to ameliorate, the prejudicial evidence are less severe •••. This approach, however, can be 
risky. It is not enough for a court to assert that there is another way to prove the case -
other specific evidence must in fact be available. 
Id. at 251 (footnotes omitted). For a case strongly asserting the defendant's right to introduce 
specific evidence to rebut the sexual innocence inference, see State v. Baker, 508 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 
1986). In Baker, the state argued that evidence already in the case showed that the 13-year-old 
victim was "street-wise and experienced," thus dispelling the sexual innocence inference. 508 
A.2d at 1062. The court rejected the state's argument, finding that the defendant had a right to a 
hearing on the admissibility of the prior sexual conduct evidence because that would definitely 
rebut the inference by unequivocally establishing the state of the child's sexual knowledge. The 
defendant did not have to rely on the more subtle method of rebutting the inference suggested by 
the state. 508 A.2d at 1062. This approach is more permissive than that suggested by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 
54. 
Other courts have considered "street-wise" evidence to be sufficient to dispel the sexual inno-
cence inference: 
A reading of the record establishes the child victim in this case was very poorly supervised 
and had largely unsupervised activity on the street and in the homes of other children, some 
older than her. Under these circumstances, it is highly likely she learned of sexual terms 
and anatomy in her play as well as with the contacts with appellant. 
Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 565 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. Super Ct. 1989). The Appenzeller court 
found that such evidence established effectively the state of the child's sexual knowledge and 
precluded any need for further testimony on the subject. 565 A.2d at 172. 
Several courts have held that other evidence in the case was sufficient to rebut the sexual 
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the evidence is offered for a limited purpose, such as to rebut the sex-
ual innocence inference in a child molestation case, the judge should 
consider "the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limit-
ing instruction."74 In deciding whether to admit the evidence subject 
to a limiting instruction, one commentator suggests that a judge con-
sider the presence of other, less prejudicial evidence: 
[The] instruction may not always be effective, but admission of the 
evidence with the limiting instruction is normally the best available rec-
onciliation of the respective interests. It seems, however, that in situa-
tions, where the danger of the jury's misuse of the evidence for the 
incompetent purpose is great, and its value for the legitimate purpose is 
slight or the point for which it is competent can be readily proved by other 
evidence, the judge's power to exclude the evidence altogether is clear in 
case law and under the Federal and Revised Uniform Rules of 
Evidence. 75 
In child molestation cases, then, a judge has the power to exclude 
prior sexual conduct evidence if other evidence is available to demon-
strate that the child had the capacity to fabricate the alleged conduct. 
Thus, the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide 
a framework to address the question of admissibility of prior sexual 
conduct evidence to rebut the sexual innocence inference. The typical 
rape shield statute, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 412, will exclude 
prior sexual conduct evidence offered to rebut the sexual innocence 
inference unless the Constitution requires the trial judge to admit the 
evidence.76 This Note argues that the Constitution only requires a 
trial judge to admit evidence which is relevant and whose probative 
value outweighs its prejudicial effect.77 Federal Rules of Evidence 401 
and 403 define the terms relevant, probative value, and prejudicial ef-
fect. 78 When one applies these rules to the sexual innocence inference 
situation, one can arrive at the following framework for analyzing this 
problem. First, the defendant must show that the child demonstrates 
sexual knowledge beyond his or her years. Second, the defendant 
must show that the evidence in question makes it more probable than 
innocence inference without admitting the prior sexual conduct evidence. See, e.g., State v. Wei-
ler, 801 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. App. 1990) ("From the State's own evidence the jury could infer 
that [the victim] was sexually aware, and the evidence defendant was not permitted to introduce 
would have added very little."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 295 (1991), affd., S.W.2d 291 (1992); 
State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298-99 (Or. App. 1989) ("[11he state presented evidence that 
children of the victim's age would have some knowledge about sexual matters. Consequently, 
the state had not advanced the theory that defendant wished to rebut."); State v. Simmons, 759 
P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1988) (''The evidence sought by further cross-examination having thus 
been already brought out ••• , defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of further cross-
examination.") (Hall, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
74. FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note. 
75. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 66, § 59, at 151-52 (emphasis added). 
76. See supra section I.A. 
77. See supra section I.B. 
78. See supra section I.C. 
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not that the prior sexual conduct furnished a source for the child's 
sexual knowledge. Third, the evidence's prejudicial effect must not 
outweigh its probative value. Within this requirement, the judge must 
consider the prejudicial effect of the prior sexual conduct evidence as 
well as the availability of other means of dispelling the sexual inno-
cence inference. If the judge finds that the evidence's prejudicial force 
outweighs its probative value, the rape shield sta~te requires the judge 
to exclude the evidence. 79 As a means of comparison, the next Part 
outlines the approaches state courts are currently using to address the 
sexual innocence inference. 
II. APPROACHES IN THE STATES 
This Part examines the various approaches states currently employ 
to determine the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence to re-
but the sexual innocence inference. Section II.A details the approach 
followed by a handful of states favoring general admissibility of the 
evidence. Conversely, section II.B examines an approach favoring in-
admissibility. Section II.C reviews the strategies of those states that 
have attempted in various ways to reach a middle ground by establish-
ing a flexible test. Finally, Section II.D discusses the law in those 
states that have declared the sexual innocence inference theory to be 
valid but have left the admissibility of the evidence to the discretion of 
the trial court. This Part concludes that each approach has its own 
merits, which may be combined to produce a coherent method of anal-
ysis for this problem. 
A. States Favoring General Admissibility 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court was among the first of the 
state courts to address the sexual innocence inference theory. In State 
v. Howard, so the court held that a defendant accused of statutory rape 
had a constitutional right to challenge the credibility of a child witness 
through the use of prior sexual conduct evidence to demonstrate a ca-
pacity to fabricate. The court found the sexual innocence inference 
theory valid: 
We believe that the average juror would perceive the average twelve-
year-old girl as a sexual innocent. Therefore, it is. probable that jurors 
would believe that the sexual experience she describes must have oc-
curred in connection with the incident being prosecuted; otherwise, she 
could not have described it. However, if statutory rape victims have had 
other sexual experiences, it would be possible for them to provide de-
tailed, realistic testimony concerning an incident that may never have 
happened. To preclude a defendant from presenting such evidence to the 
jury, if it is otherwise admissible, would be obvious error. Accordingly, a 
79. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
80. 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981). 
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defendant must be afforded the opportunity to show, by specific inci-
dents of sexual conduct, that the prosecutrix has the experience and abil-
ity to contrive a statutory rape charge against him.81 
The court was unpersuaded by arguments that New Hampshire's 
rape shield statute, generally considered among the toughest in the 
nation, 82 prevented the admission of the prior sexual conduct evi-
dence; it held that the rape shield statute must yield to the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 83 
Although the "otherwise admissible" clause suggests that the court 
required a specific examination of the evidence offered on relevance 
grounds, the court did not make such an examination. It instead fo-
cused on the conflict with the rape shield statute. Once it decided that 
the statute had to accommodate the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights, there was no need for further analysis and the matter was re-
manded for retrial. 84 
Using a somewhat different approach, the Nevada Supreme Court 
in Summitt v. State 85 reached the same result in a child molestation 
case. The court held that the prior sexual conduct evidence was ad-
missible to show a capacity to fabricate because the admission of the 
evidence would not offend the purpose behind the rape shield stat-
ute, 86 namely, to prevent general attacks on a victim's character.87 Be-
cause this evidence "was offered to show knowledge of such acts 
rather than lack of chastity," the purpose of the rape shield statute 
81. 426 A.2d at 462 (emphasis added). The defendant's offer of proof stated that the prior 
sexual conduct evidence would show that the prosecuting witness had been seen " 'masturbating 
a bull,' " had "had sex with her father and grandfather, the latter in exchange for money," and 
had undressed young boys she was babysitting to play with them naked. 426 A.2d at 458. 
82. See N.H. RE.v. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1986); N.H. R. EVID. 412; Tanford & Bocchino, 
supra note 22, at 596-602. 
83. 426 A.2d at 460 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). In Davis, the Court held 
that a defendant in a criminal case must be allowed to attack a prosecution witness' credibility by 
disclosing that witness' juvenile criminal record which revealed a possible bias against the de-
fendant. 415 U.S. at 316-17. The Court held that the state's interest in the confidentiality of 
juvenile criminal records did not override the defendant's rights. 415 U.S. at 320. The Howard 
court, looking to Davis, acknowledged the defendant's right to attack the child's credibility by 
exposing an alternative source of sexual knowledge that gave the child the capacity to fabricate. 
426 A.2d at 460-61. 
84. The Howard court correctly recbgnized that the state's rape shield statute could not ex-
clude evidence that was constitutionally required to be admitted. 426 A.2d at 460-61. Because 
the New Hampshire statute, unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 412, did not contain a "constitu-
tionally required to be admitted" exception, the court undoubtedly found itself in the difficult 
position of either declaring the controversial statute unconstitutional on its face or creating via 
judicial opinion a "constitutionally required" exception. The Howard court chose the latter op-
tion. 426 A.2d at 460-61. See infra note 91 for a discussion of the necessity of a "constitution-
ally required" exception in rape shield statutes. 
85. 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Nev. 1985). 
86. 697 P.2d at 1377. The defendant sought to introduce evidence of an instance of inter-
course, fellatio, and fondling performed on the prosecuting witness when she was four. The child 
was six at the time of the charged offense. 697 P.2d at 1375. 
87. 697 P.2d at 1375. 
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would not be violated by its admission. 88 
In Maine, courts have held that the sexual innocence inference is a 
valid theory and that efforts to limit a defendant's attempt to rebut the 
inference violate his confrontation rights. In State v. Jacques, 89 the 
Supreme Court of Maine held: 
Where the victim is a child, as in this case, the lack of sexual experience 
is automatically in the case without specific action by the prosecutor. A 
defendant therefore must be permitted to rebut the inference a jury 
might otherwise draw that the victim was so naive sexually that she 
could not have fabricated the charge. 9o 
The Jacques court found that evidence rebutting this inference, even if 
it involved the victim's prior sexual conduct, was constitutionally re-
quired to be admitted and thus overcame the blanket exclusion of the 
state's rape shield statute.91 
Courts following the general admissibility approach thus make a 
number of assumptions. First, these courts assume that the sexual in-
nocence inference theory is valid.92 Also, they generally assume that 
evidence of prior sexual conduct is relevant without comparing details 
of the prior molestation with those of the charged offense. 93 As Part I 
of this Note demonstrated, the defendant has no right to present irrele-
vant evidence; the defendant must first establish the evidence's rele-
vance before claiming any violation of his constitutional rights.94 
88. 697 P.2d at 1377. 
89. 558 A.2d 706 (Me. 1989). 
90. 558 A.2d at 708. 
91. 558 A.2d at 708. Maine has adopted rules of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. See 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 18, at xxv & n.1. However, Maine's rape 
shield statute, ME. R. Evm. 412, is substantially tougher than the federal rule because it contains 
no catch-all provision that admits evidence if it is "constitutionally required." See Galvin, supra 
note 5, at 908-09, 914-15. In fact, Professor Galvin argues that by omitting provisions such as a 
"constitutionally required" exception, the Maine statute and others like it "fail to afford the 
accused the opportunity to present sexual conduct evidence which is indisputably relevant and 
necessary to the presentation of a legitimate defense theory." Id. at 814. 
Like the Howard court, see supra note 84, the Jacques court added a "constitutionally re-
quired to be admitted" exception to its interpretation of Maine's rape shield statute. In admitting 
prior sexual conduct evidence, the Jacques court noted the absence of an express "constitution-
ally required" exception in its statute, but added that "the Advisory Committee Note is explicit 
that 'evidence constitutionally required to be admitted' overrides the exclusion in the text of Rule 
412." 558 A.2d at 708 (citations omitted). 
92. See, e.g., Howard, 426 A.2d at 462; Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708; Summitt, 691 P.2d at 1377. 
93. For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Howard simply compared the pur-
poses of the rape shield statute with the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, 426 A.2d at 460-
62, rather than continuing on, as this Note argues it should, to question the relevance, probative 
value, and prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence. See supra section I.C. Likewise, in Sum-
mitt, although the Nevada Supreme Court indicated that the trial court should balance the pro-
bative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, the court itself did not engage in such 
balancing. 697 P.2d at 1377. The Summitt court either assumed that the evidence was relevant 
- and simply omitted its relevance analysis from the opinion - or ignored the issue of relevance 
altogether. In any event, neither court stressed the first requirement for admissibility of evidence: 
relevance. See FED. R. Evm. 401. 
94. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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Finally, these courts resolve the conflict between the defendant's right 
to cross-examine and the rape shield statute's prohibition against such 
evidence by arguing either that it is constitutionally required95 or that 
its admission, because the issue is sexual knowledge and not consent, 
does not frustrate the purposes behind the statute. 96 
-B. States Favoring General Inadmissibility 
Courts that do not admit prior sexual conduct evidence to show an 
alternative source for a child's sexual knowledge generally reject the 
sexual innocence inference theory, refusing to believe that juries rea-
son in such a manner. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, stated 
that the sexual innocence inference theory "is based on unsubstanti-
ated assumptions and fears about what a jury may infer from the com-
plaining witness's testimony."97 
The Iowa court approached the issue from the same starting point 
as the Maine Supreme Court in Jacques, stating that its rape shield 
statute, modeled on Federal Rule 412, prohibited the admission of the 
evidence unless it was constitutionally required.98 The court then 
evaluated the issue under the relevancy and prejudice tests. 99 The 
court concluded that the prior sexual conduct evidence would have 
little probative value and that the sexual innocence inference theory 
itself was unpersuasive.100 Furthermore, the court evaluated the rele-
vance and prejudice concerns: 
The evidence which the trial court ruled admissible is, at most, of very 
marginal probative value. It certainly does not constitute evidence 
whose probative value outweighs the substantial danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, and invasion of com-
plainant's privacy which rule 412 and other rape shield laws are designed 
to prevent.101 
The Iowa court reached a substantially different conclusion than the 
Maine court did in Jacques, despite starting from the same position, 
because the Iowa court looked more carefully at the competing issues 
9S. Howard, 426 A.2d at 460-61; Jacques, SSS A.2d at 708. 
96. Summitt, 697 P.2d at 137S, 1377. 
97. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d lSS, 163 (Iowa 1984); cf. People v. Rice, 709 P.2d 67, 68-69 
(Colo. App. 198S) (refusing to admit prior sexual conduct evidence, asserting that Colorado's 
rape shield statute by its terms prohibited the testimony). 
98. 343 N.W.2d at 160-61. 
99. 343 N.W.2d at 162-63. 
100. 343 N.W.2d at 163 ("[W]e find no logical or natural inference that the complaining 
witness could more plausibly describe a fantasized act of oral sex if she had experienced oral sex 
with another person."). · 
101. 343 N.W.2d at 163. At least one court has read Clarke to mean that prior sexual con-
duct evidence offered to rebut the sexual innocence inference is not admissible under any aspect 
of Rule 412. See State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 1987). Iowa Rule 412 is modeled 
on the federal rule. See 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 18, at xxv & n.1; Galvin, supra note 
S, at 914-lS. 
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of probative value and prejudicial effect, as this Note recommends. 102 
The Michigan Supreme Court similarly rejected the sexual inno-
cence inference, stating that "[a] jury is unlikely to consider a witness's 
ability to describe sexual conduct as an independent factor supporting 
a conviction."103 The court's primary reason for rejecting the evi-
dence was a lack of relevance combined with the tremendous potential 
for prejudice.104 For the evidence to have any relevance at all, it 
would have to include details of the prior sexual conduct so that those 
details could be compared with those in the charged offense; the court 
found that making such a comparison would create a "real danger" of 
misleading the jury as well as invading the victim's privacy.105 The 
court also ruled that the sexual innocence inference will arguably have 
some probative value only when the victims are young children; the 
court stated, however, that these same young children "are among the 
persons whom the [rape shield] statute was designed to protect."106 
Even if juries made such inferences, the court said, there were alterna-
tive methods of rebutting the inference: 
[I]n most of the cases in which the source of the victim's ability to de-
scribe a sexual act may be relevant, there are other means by which one 
can inquire into that source of knowledge without necessarily producing 
evidence of sexual conduct with others. Counsel could inquire whether 
the victim had any experiences (e.g., reading a book, seeing a movie, 
conversing with others, schoolwork or witnessing others engaged in such 
activity) which aided him or her in describing the conduct that is 
alleged.101 
Thus, both the Michigan and Iowa courts applied relevance and preju-
dice rules in dismissing the sexual innocence inference, finding that 
such evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial in general. In fact, it ap-
pears that the courts functioned much as the legislatures did in draft-
ing the rape shield statutes - they simply declared an entire category 
of evidence to be inadmissible in every situation. 
C. States Using Structured Tests for Admissibility 
The previous two sections illustrated how one group of courts has 
102. See infra Part III. 
103. People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982). 
104. 330 N.W.2d at 818. 
105. 330 N.W.2d at 818. 
106. 330 N.W.2d at 818. 
107. 330 N.W.2d at 818. At least one Michigan judge would like to reconsider Arenda in 
light of the approaches taken by courts in other states, which are examined in sections C and D 
of this Part. See People v. Adams, 440 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J., dissenting) (order 
denying review). In addition to reconsidering the court's position on the sexual innocence infer-
ence, Justice Levin would reconsider whether the defendant's conviction should be reversed be-
cause the prosecutor had asked during closing argument, " 'how does a five year old ••• know 
about all of these things,' " while the defendant was barred by Arenda from presenting evidence 
to answer that question. 440 N.W.2d at 416-17. 
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judged prior sexual conduct evidence relevant to rebut the sexual inno-
cence inference while the other group judged such evidence irrelevant 
and challenged the validity of the inference itself. This section looks at 
those courts that have acknowledged the validity of the sexual inno-
cence inference theory but have sought a middle-ground approach by 
establishing a structured test to determine admissibility on a case-by-
case basis. 
The common requirement for admissibility under these tests is that 
the prior sexual conduct must be similar to the charged offense. As 
the Massachusetts high court said in Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 108 this 
test is really a relevance inquiry: 
If a defendant challenges the reliability of a child's testimony about 
sexual abuse, it is unfair to deprive him of the right to show that the 
child had personal knowledge of sexual acts and terminology .... If the 
victim had been sexually abused in the past in a manner similar to the 
abuse in the instant case, such evidence would be admissible at trial be-
cause it is relevant on the issue of the victim's knowledge about sexual 
matters. 
We do not hold, however, that evidence of prior sexual abuse of the 
victim is admissible at trial for all purposes. . .. If the defendant wishes 
to use evidence of the victim's prior abuse for a purpose other than to 
show knowledge about sexual acts and terminology, then he will have to 
show how the evidence of prior abuse is relevant on that issue. Absent 
such a showing by the defendant of prior similar sexual abuse, it is diffi-
cult to envision a situation where evidence of the details of prior sexual 
abuse would be relevant.109 
Rujfen acknowledged the sexual innocence inference theory and held 
that similar prior sexual conduct was admissible to challenge the relia-
bility of the child's testimony.110 The court stated, however, that it 
diO not hold the evidence admissible for all purposes; the defendant 
was still required to satisfy relevance principles. 111 
In State v. Oliver, 112 the Arizona Supreme Court, citing Ruffen for 
support, established a two-prong test to evaluate the admissibility of 
prior sexual conduct evidence. Under the first prong, the defendant 
108. 507 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 1987). 
109. 507 N.E.2d at 687-88 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
110. 507 N.E.2d at 688. 
111. 507 N.E.2d at 688. A Massachusetts appellate court has applied this test on at least one 
occasion. See Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 691, 695-97 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). In 
Rathbum, the trial court had found that the prior sexual conduct was not sufficiently similar to 
be relevant. 532 N.E.2d at 696. Defense counsel, conceding the lack of similarity, argued that 
the evidence was nonetheless admissible because the prior abuse was "far greater'' than that in 
the charged offense. The trial court based its ruling on the lack of similarity and excluded the 
evidence. The appellate court found support for the judge's ruling but also rejected the evidence 
on a different ground. The court ruled that the victim, a 13-year-old girl, had not demonstrated 
knowledge of sexual matters beyond her years and thus the jury would be unlikely to make the 
sexual innocence inference. 532 N.E.2d at 696. 
112. 760 P.2d 1071 (Ariz. 1988). 
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must make an ii; camera showing that the prior sexual conduct did 
occur.113 Under the second prong, the defendant must show that the 
prior sexual conduct was sufficiently similar to the charged offense 
that the prior conduct would have provided the child with the sexual 
knowledge necessary to fabricate the charge.114 
Most recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Puliz-
zano 115 unveiled a five-part test to address the admissibility of prior 
sexual conduct evidence in child molestation cases. The court viewed 
the sexual innocence inference theory as valid and stated that because 
the sexual knowledge added credibility to the child's testimony, the 
defendant must be allowed to show an alternative source of sexual 
knowledge to attack the child's credibility.116 To determine when 
prior sexual conduct evidence is admissible to demonstrate an alterna-
tive source, the court articulated the following test: 
[The defendant must show] (1) that the prior acts clearly occurred; (2) 
that the acts closely resembled those of the present case; (3) that the 
prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue; ( 4) that the evidence is 
necessary to the defendant's case; and (5) that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.111 
Once the defendant has made this showing, the evidence is admissible 
unless the state's interest in excluding the evidence is so compelling as 
to override the defendant's right to present the evidence.118 
113. 760 P.2d at 1077. 
114. 760 P.2d at 1077. The court also applied relevance and prejudice principles in setting 
up the test, but as this Note argues, infra section III.A, applied them incorrectly. The court 
made its relevance determination on the basis of the sexual innocence inference theory Itself 
rather than the facts of the case. That is, the court said that the evidence was relevant because it 
believed that a jury might infer that a child could have acquired such sexual knowledge only 
through contact with the defendant. 760 P.2d at 1077. Having said that the prior sexual con-
duct evidence is relevant to rebut the sexual innocence inference, the court viewed the "suffi-
ciently similar'' test as a means of applying the prejudice principles of Rule 403. As explained in 
Part III, infra, such an approach is incorrect because the "sufficiently similar'' test is a necessary 
part of any relevance inquiry and is not a Rule 403 inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 
139-41. Under this Note's recommended approach, Rule 403 requires an inquiry into the exist· 
ence of other, less prejudicial evidence that will function to rebut the sexual innocence inference. 
115. 456 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1990). 
116. 456 N.W.2d at 334-35. 
117. 456 N.W.2d at 335. 
118. 456 N.W.2d at 335. In the case at issue, the court found that the state's interest was not 
so compelling as to override the defendant's right to present the evidence. The court provided 
little guidance on the application of this part of the test. It appears that if the defendant satisfies 
the five-part test, the state's interest will generally be subordinate to the defendant's rights. See, 
e.g., State v. Moats, 457 N.W.2d 299, 317 (Wis. 1990) ("In Pulizzano, we concluded that the 
state's interest in promoting effective law enforcement was not sufficient to overcome that defend-
ant's constitutional right to present evidence. This same ruling applies equally to the case now 
before us.") (citation omitted). 
In Moats, the court attempted to apply the test it developed in Pulizzano. Both parties agreed 
that a prior molestation had occurred, and thus the first requirement was easily met. The second 
requirement was the most hotly contested, with the trial court finding that the defendant had 
satisfied it. The court held that the evidence met the third requirement because the fact that the 
child did have an alternative source for her sexual knowledge was a material issue and the prior 
molestation was relevant to show that source. The fourth requirement was satisfied because the 
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Thus, courts that use structured tests to evaluate this issue all in-
clude a similarity requirement but add other concerns as well. As Part 
III makes . clear, the tests are incomplete attempts to resolve this 
problem. 
D. States Using Other Approaches 
This section discusses cases in which courts have ruled that the 
sexual innocence inference theory can be relevant to the admission of a 
child's prior sexual conduct but have declined to formulate any precise 
tests. These courts essentially give wide discretion to the trial judge 
and simply encourage the judge to make his or her evaluation based on 
principles found in evidence rules. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Benedict 119 acknowl-
edged the sexual innocence inference theory and held that a judge had 
discretion to admit evidence otherwise barred by a rape shield statute 
for the purpose of rebutting the alleged victim's sexual innocence.120 
The court required only that the trial judge make a Rule 403 inquiry 
by balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial 
effect.121 The Minnesota approach essentially requires that if a trial 
judge believes a jury may be tempted to make the sexual innocence 
inference given the age of the child, then he or she may admit prior 
sexual conduct evidence so long as its probative value outweighs its 
prejudicial eff ect.122 
In a case in which the defendant did not expressly raise the sexual 
innocence inference, the Mississippi Supreme Court characterized the 
defendant's attempt to show the relevance of the child's prior molesta-
tion as "tenuous at the very best."123 The court did, however, note 
"the natural tendency of a jury hearing a child of tender years graphi-
cally relate a sexual battery to believe it must be true, otherwise the 
little child would never have known about it."124 The court then con-
defendant needed the evidence to rebut the sexual innocence inference. The defendant met the 
fifth requirement because the trial court could use limiting instructions to ensure that the trier of 
fact would only use the evidence for the purpose for which it was admitted. 457 N.W.2d at 316-
17. Consequently, the court allowed the defendant to introduce the evidence. 457 N.W.2d at 
317. 
But only the first two requirements of the five-part test as applied in Moats have any force. 
The court essentially stated that the third and fourth requirements would always be met when 
the purpose for the evidence's admission is to rebut the sexual innocence inference. 457 N.W.2d 
at 316-17. The fifth requirement, essentially embodying Rule 403 principles, merited little dis-
cussion in Moats. Part III of this Note argues that Rule 403 principles should not receive such a 
cursory examination. 
119. State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1986). 
120. 397 N.W.2d at 341. 
121. 397 N.W.2d at 341. 
122. 397 N.W.2d at 341; see also State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Minn. App. 1989); 
Wedan v. State, 409 N.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Minn. App. 1987). 
123. Woodruffv. State, 518 So. 2d 669, 672 (Miss. 1988). 
124. 518 So. 2d at 672. 
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eluded that although there are certain situations in which a child's 
prior molestation can be relevant, "[e]ach case is different, and rele-
vancy must be determined by the trial judge." 125 
Thus, some appellate courts have declined to provide a general so-
lution to this issue. They have, instead, shifted the onus onto the trial 
courts, with little guidance, to apply basic evidence principles and ex-
ercise their discretion to reach the most just results. 126 These courts 
have correctly focused on the rules of evidence as the proper tools of 
analysis, but have failed to offer a principled solution to the sexual 
innocence inference problem. 
In sum, state courts have followed four approaches in resolving the 
problems posed by the sexual innocence inference theory. Some 
courts believe in the validity of the theory and consequently hold that 
a prior molestation is generally admissible to demonstrate a child's 
capacity to fabricate. Other courts reach a contrary conclusion, hold-
ing that the theory is invalid and thus rape shield statutes may block 
constitutionally the admission of such evidence. A third group of 
courts acknowledges the validity of the theory but holds that trial 
courts must employ flexible tests on a case by case basis to determine 
the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence. The fourth group 
of courts, grouped together primarily because their approaches do not 
fit the first three categories, has not provided a theoretical solution to 
the problem but instead has encouraged trial courts, relying on their 
discretion to produce fair and just determinations, to use the rules of 
evidence governing relevance and prejudice to analyze this issue. Any 
attempt to formulate a better method of handling the sexual innocence 
inference theory will necessarily borrow concepts from each of these 
four groups. 
125. 518 So. 2d at 672. Utah also resolves this problem by applying relevance and prejudice 
principles. See State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988) ("The pertinency of this test is 
that character evidence, many times, is of slight probative value, is very prejudicial, and may 
confuse the issues at trial."); State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988) (ruling that 
other previously admitted evidence sufficed to dispel any sexual innocence inference). 
126. A number of jurisdictions have dealt with the sexual innocence inference theory tangen-
tially. In Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 565 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. Super. 1989), for example, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the prior sexual conduct evidence was properly e.x· 
cluded as irrelevant. The court found that other evidence before the jury dispelled the sexual 
innocence inference: "A reading of the record establishes the child victim in this case was very 
poorly supervised and had largely unsupervised activity on the street and in homes of other 
children, some older than her. Under these circumstances, it is highly likely she learned of sex-
ual terms and anatomy in her play as well as with the contacts with appellant." 565 A.2d at 172. 
The court also seemed to imply that the sexual innocence inference theory was valid only if the 
prosecution had opened the door by laying a foundation "that her knowledge of sexual tech· 
niques and nomenclature was derived from the contact with appellant and his co-conspirator." 
565 A.2d at 171. The court concluded that because other evidence rebutted the sexual innocence 
inference, "[t]he best that appellant's presentation would show is that the child may also have 
been molested by other persons." 565 A.2d at 172. 
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III. APPLICATIONS IN CHILD MOLESTATION CASES 
This Part applies the rules of evidence discussed in Part I and the 
case analyses in Part II to the facts and conflicts present in the typical 
child molestation case in which a defendant attempts to rebut the sex-
ual innocence inference. Section Ill.A applies the relevance tests em-
bodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Section 111.B applies the 
concerns behind Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to determine whether 
the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. 
This Part concludes by drawing on the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the state courts' approaches to formulate an admissibility test that pro-
tects the defendant's constitutional rights while remaining faithful to 
the policies underlying rape shield statutes. 
A. Relevance Principles Applied 
In the typical case, the defendant wants to introduce evidence of 
the prior sexual conduct of the child to demonstrate the child's capac-
ity to fabricate, so as to rebut the sexual innocence inference.127 Such 
evidence renders the child's testimony less compelling and, thus, any 
attempt to introduce the evidence is an attack on the child's credibil-
ity.128 Such attacks on credibility, however, are permissible only if 
they are relevant.129 To be relevant, evidence must meet two require-
ments. First, the proposition the evidence is offered to prove must be 
of consequence to the proceeding.130 Second, the evidence must be 
probative of that proposition.131 This section considers these require-
ments in turn. 
The credibility of a witness is always a fact of consequence to the 
proceeding.132 Attempting to introduce evidence of the child's prior 
sexual conduct is really an attack on the child's credibility because it 
questions the source of the child's knowledge of sexual matters. A 
jury that makes the sexual innocence inference assumes that the de-
fendant's actions were the source of the child's knowledge because the 
child is too young to have acquired such knowledge independently. If 
the jury does not make the sexual innocence inference, then the source 
of the child's knowledge is irrelevant because the jury is not giving the 
child's testimony any additional credibility due to the child's supposed 
naivete. In sum, the jury should not make the sexual innocence infer-
ence when, in light of the child's age, her testimony does not demon-
127. See supra text accompanying notes 10-18. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 10-18. 
129. 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GoLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 6092, at 489 (1990). 
130. FED. R. Evm. 401; see United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. Unit A 
Aug. 1981). 
131. FED. R. Evm. 401; Hall. 653 F.2d at 1005. 
132. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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strate knowledge of sexual matters beyond her years.133 
A crucial question is how old a child must be before the sexual 
innocence inference theory can be categorically denied as a valid 
grounds for the admission of prior sexual conduct evidence.134 In the 
cases surveyed by this Note, trial courts have applied the sexual inno-
cence inference theory to children as old as twelve.135 At least one 
court has decided against applying the sexual innocence inference the-
ory to a thirteen-year-old child.136 Although there are always excep-
tions to any blanket generalization, 137 this Note suggests a 
presumptive ban on the use of the sexual innocence inference theory of 
admissibility with children older than twelve at the time of trial. In 
certain situations, however, the trial judge may find it appropriate to 
adjust that threshold age.13s 
133. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
134. No case researched for this Note has directly ruled whether a judge should use the 
victim's age at the time of the reporting of the incident or the victim's age at the time of trinl to 
determine whether the jury is likely to make the sexual innocence inference. Reasonable argu· 
ments could be made in support of both positions. In support of using the age at the time of the 
incident, the defendant could argue that the very purpose of introducing the prior sexunl conduct 
evidence is to show the child's capacity to fabricate at the time she reported the incident. When a 
prosecutor notes that an 11-year-old child made her first report at age nine, the jury is likely to 
consider the younger age as the most relevant for judging her capacity to fabricate: if the story 
was fabricated, that was the time when the child first could have possessed the capacity to do so. 
On the opposite side, the prosecutor could argue that the child's age at the time of trial is the 
relevant age because the sexual innocence inference theory is essentially a theory based on the 
intuitive responses of a jury to a witness testifying in its presence. The jury considers the testi-
mony as it comes from the person appearing on the witness stand. Any credibility it adds or 
subtracts results from its assessment of the child's demeanor at that point in time, not at the time 
the report is first made. In other words, the jury either makes or does not make the sexunl 
innocence inference on the basis of the witness before it. Thus the age of the child at trial is the 
relevant age. 
Courts seem to imply that they are using the child's age at the time of trial as the relevant 
marking point. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 691, 696 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1988) ("[T]he testimony of the victim, who was thirteen at the time of trial, did not demonstrate 
'extraordinary knowledge' of sexual acts or sexual matters in general.") (emphasis added). 
135. See State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981) ("We believe that the average juror 
would perceive the average twelve-year-old girl as a sexual innocent."). 
136. See Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d at 696. 
-137. See, e.g., State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding that the 
sexual innocence inference theory could be applied in the case of an adult victim with a mental 
age of seven and a half). 
138. The judge may find that a lower or higher age is more appropriate depending on the 
characteristics of the community. Setting the upper limit at 12 years of age, however, does not 
seem unreasonable in that children most likely have acquired a developed sexual knowledge by 
this time and so should no longer be presumed to be innocent of such matters. The average 
American female experiences her first menstrual flow at 12.8 years of age. JAMES M. TANNER, 
FOETUS INTO MAN: PHYSICAL GROWTII FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 146 (1990). The 
average European male has an acceleration of penis growth at 12.5 years of age, id. at 59, and the 
first spontaneous ejaculation of semen, usually in the form of a "wet dream," generally occurs 
approximately one year later. Id. at 62. For North American males, penis growth acceleration 
occurs approximately four months earlier. Id. at 59. . 
In addition to these physical changes, behavioral research indicates that most children have 
had some sort of sexual experience before age 12. In one study, over 82% of those responding 
said that they had had "some kind of sexual experience with another person before the age of 
12." RONALD GOLDMAN & JULIETTE GOLDMAN, SHOW ME YOURS!: UNDERSTANDING 
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Assume that the first requirement of relevance, that the proposi-
tion to be proved is of consequence to the proceeding, is satisfied when 
the child is twelve years old or younger. Under the second require-
ment of relevance, that the evidence is probative of the proposition it is 
offered to prove, the evidence of prior sexual conduct must show that 
the child had the capacity to fabricate the story of molestation.139 The 
prior sexual conduct must have been similar enough to the charged 
conduct so that a child experiencing the first molestation would have 
acquired sufficient sexual knowledge via that encounter to be able to 
fabricate the charged conduct. The Arizona Supreme Court uses such 
a similarity test in its approach to the sexual innocence inference: 
"[T]he defendant must establish that the prior sexual act was suffi-
ciently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experi-
ence and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge."140 It 
is not enough that the prior conduct be more severe in nature than the 
charged offense; the actual details of the two incidents should be 
imil 141 s ar. 
Thus, to meet the relevance requirements of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401, the defendant must prove two things: 
(1) That the child is young enough at the time of trial such that the 
jury might make the sexual innocence inference. As an initial presump-
tion subject to rebuttal, a court may assume that the jury will make the 
inference when the child is twelve years old or younger; and 
(2) That the prior sexual conduct is sufficiently similar to the 
charged offense such that experiencing the prior incident would give the 
child the specific knowledge necessary to be able to fabricate the charged 
offense. 
If the defendant's offer of proof satisfies this test, he must then face the 
rigors of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 
CHILDREN'S SEXUALITY 149 (1988). Sixty percent of those responding stated that they had had 
a sexual experience with other children before age 12. These sexual experiences ranged from 
exhibitionism to touching another's sex organ or being touched. Id. at 154. The authors charac-
terized the children's behavior as "playful curiosity and a mutual exploration of sexuality, not of 
the sexual reproduction activities or sexual pleasures of mature adults." Id. at 155. 
Another study based on the analysis of written answers to various questions about sexual 
knowledge by children from kindergarten age to sixth grade concluded that children possess 
"overt sexual interest and knowledge. There is a continuing, progressive expansion of social 
awareness and activities." Samuel S. Janus & Barbara E. Bess, Latency: Fact or Fiction, in 
CHILDREN AND SEX: NEW FINDINGS, NEW PERSPECTIVES 75, 81 (Larry L. Constantine & 
Floyd M. Martinson eds., 1981). 
Thus, although there is always some arbitrariness involved in line drawing, empirical support 
exists for a preliminary assumption that children aged 13 and older are not innocent of sexual 
matters. 
139. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
140. State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Ariz. 1988). 
141. See, e.g., Rathbum. 532 N.E.2d at 696, discussed supra note 111. 
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B. Prejudice Principles Applied 
When Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is applied to child molestation 
cases, the only possible method the defendant can use to admit prior 
sexual conduct evidence is the "constitutionally required" excep-
tion, 142 which permits admission only if the probative value of relevant 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.143 This section addresses the 
question of prejudice, using Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 412 as 
the primary tools of analysis. It ·argues that, in light of the rape shield 
statute, if the trial judge has the power to exclude the evidence because 
its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, he or she must ex-
clude it. 
At the outset, it is important to identify what this Note means by 
the term prejudice in child molestation cases. When state legislators 
passed rape shield. statutes, two separate rationales sparked them to 
action. First, it had become clear that a woman's sexual relations 
outside of marriage were not probative, in most situations, of whether 
she had consented to sex in the occasion at issue.144 This rationale, 
which this Note refers to as the evidentiary rationale, essentially repre-
sented a judgment that the admission of the woman's prior sexual con-
duct encouraged jurors to believe that the woman had a character flaw 
which caused her to consent to sex in situations in which normal wo-
men would not have consented, thus prejudicing the jury with no sig-
nifi.cant probative benefit.145 Second, the legislators listened to 
proponents of rape shield legislation who argued that the ease with 
which trial courts admitted potentially embarrassing prior sexual con-
duct evidence discouraged women from reporting and prosecuting 
rapes to avoid possible humiliation at trial.146 This rationale, which 
this Note refers to as the privacy rationale, focuses on encouraging the 
reporting of rapes as well as eliminating unnecessary harm to the vic-
tim. When applying rape shield statutes in child molestation cases, it 
is important to determine whether the two types of prejudice denoted 
by these rationales are present. 
1. The Privacy Rationale 
The privacy rationale loses some of its potency in the child moles-
tation context. The Court of Appeals of Washington reasoned in State 
v. Carver 147 that admitting the prior molestations of two children into 
evidence would not be an indictment of the character of the victims 
because the victims "were young girls who were incapable of con-
142. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38. 
143. See supra note 58. 
144. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
147. 678 P.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
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senting to such acts."148 The Carver court's argument does have some 
force. In the rape context, the woman is accusing the defendant of a· 
crime committed against her will; the defendant may seek to introduce 
evidence of the woman's willing participation in prior sexual activities 
with others. Evidence of willing participation may be a reflection on a 
person's character; consequently, if defense attorneys are likely to in-
dulge in a humiliating and embarrassing examination of this so-called 
character flaw in most rape prosecutions, 149 women are unlikely to 
report rapes. In a child molestation case, however, the defendant 
seeks to introduce evidence that the child was the unwilling partici-
pant in previous sexual encounters with others. The Carver court es-
sentially argues that because a child is considered a victim of these 
prior attacks rather than a willing participant, cross-examination of 
these matters, though difficult for the child, will not represent an in-
dictment of the child's character and thus sliould not discourage child 
molestations from being reported.150 
The privacy rationale's other factor, reducing unnecessary harm to 
the victim-witness, remains strong in the child molestation context. 
The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Arenda 151 concluded that 
"[t]hese children and others are the ones who are most likely to be 
adversely affected by unwarranted and unreasonable cross-examina-
tion into these areas. They are among the persons whom the statute 
was designed to protect."152 However, over the years courts have de-
veloped several procedural methods of reducing the amount of harm 
suffered by the child when the child testifies, while still protecting the 
defendant's confrontation rights. 153 Although the child may suffer 
148. 678 P.2d at 843. 
149. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
150. See State v. Budis, 580 A.2d 283, 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), ajfd, 593 A.2d 
784 (1991) (''The evidence was not offered to establish any of the classic inferences the [rape 
shield] law was meant to interdict. Inclination to consent was not an issue in the case because of 
the victim's age. Further, the proffered testimony as to [the child's] prior victimization did not 
implicate her own 'conduct' and could not place her moral character in issue in any way."). 
Moreover, this Note argues that a child and her guardian, having decided to pursue a prosecu-
tion for the charged offense, would likely not abandon their plan once they learned that the child 
would have to testify to the prior abuse as well. Once a child and guardian have decided to 
endure the pain of testifying to one sexual assault, the addition of another would probably not 
dissuade them, especially because neither the prior abuse nor the charged abuse is an indictment 
of the child's character. 
151. 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982). 
152. 330 N.W.2d at 818. 
153. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), upheld the use of 
one-way closed circuit television of a child's testimony. In Craig, a state statute authorized a 
judge, upon determining that testifying in the presence of the defendant will cause the child to 
suffer "serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate," 497 U.S. 
at 841, to allow the child to testify in another room and televise her testimony into the court-
room. The prosecutor and the defense attorney accompanied the child witness in the room while 
the judge remained with the jury and the defendant in the courtroom. The defendant was in 
constant communication with his attorney electronically. 497 U.S. at 841-42. Approving the 
procedure, the Court stated through Justice O'Connor that the Confrontation Clause did not 
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some harm through testifying, 154 the availability of these methods of 
reducing that harm serves to render the privacy rationale slightly less 
compelling when applied to child molestation cases. The evidentiary 
rationale, however, more than compensates for this weakness and sup-
ports exclusion of prior molestation evidence. 
2. The Evidentiary Rationale 
The evidentiary rationale focuses on how prior sexual conduct evi-
dence may affect the jury. This Note argues that such evidence can 
damage a child's credibility in the eyes of a jury by enabling the jurors 
to believe, unreasonably, that a child who has suffered prior sexual 
abuse is much more likely to fabricate a second charge. This argu-
ment follows intuitively from a number of factors. 
First, existing empirical studies tend to support a hypothesis that 
such evidence will prejudice the jury against the child because, as a 
guarantee an "absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial." 497 
U.S. at 844. The Confrontation Clause did not prohibit such a procedure "[s]o long as a trial 
court makes .•• a case-specific finding of necessity." 497 U.S. at 860. 
The absence ofa specific determination of necessity appeared to be the decisive issue in Coy v. 
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), in which the Court held that the defendant's confrontation rights 
were violated when the trial court authorized a screen to be placed between the witnesses and the 
defendant, preventing the witnesses from seeing the defendant and presumably enabling them to 
feel more comfortable. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that "rights con· 
ferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute," but stated that no exception to the clause's 
general requirement of face-to-face confrontation applied in this case because "there have been 
no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection •••• " 487 
U.S. at 1020-21. 
Thus Craig and Coy stand for the proposition that such procedural measures which seek "to 
further the important state interest in preventing trauma to child witnesses in child abuse cases," 
Craig, 491 U.S. at 856-57, are constitutionally permissible if the trial court makes a particular-
ized finding of need in the case at bar. 
For a discussion of these procedural safeguards, see generally Josephine A. Bulkley, Recent 
Supreme Court Decisions Ease Child Abuse Prosecutions: Use of Closed-Circuit Television and 
Children's Statements of Abuse Under the Confrontation Clause, 16 NOVA L. REV. 687 (1992); 
Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 IIAsTINGS L.J. 1259 (1992). 
154. Some early research suggested that the legal process can compound the emotional 
trauma of the child sexual abuse victim. See Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony 
of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. lssUES, Summer 1984, at 125, 128; Gail S. 
Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Research and Legal Prac-
tice, 40 J. Soc. lssUES, Summer 1984, at 157, 167-68 (summarizing existing research). Recent 
research, however, suggests that some children may benefit from the experience. See SANDRA B. 
SMITH, CHILDREN'S STORY: SEXUALLY MOLESTED CHILDREN IN CRIMINAL COURT 11·12 
(1985) ("A misplaced desire to protect the child sometimes results in prosecutors, police officers, 
and other well-meaning adults treating the child like a china doll •••• While there are some really 
valid reasons to not go through a court proceeding, the china doll syndrome should not be one of 
them .••• Molested children have Jost control over the most fundamental concept of the self: the 
integrity of one's body. Investigation and prosecution allow a child a safe forum from which to 
vent that anger and rage."); Desmond K. Runyan et al., Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexually 
Abused Children. 113 J. PEDIATRICS 647, 652 (1988) (''These data support a hypothesis that 
juvenile court testimony is not harmful and may actually be therapeutic for child victims."); John 
F. Tedesco & Steven V. Schnell, Children's Reactions to Sex Abuse Investigation and Litigation, 
11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 267, 270 (1987) ("Data obtained from the sample did not, how· 
ever, support the idea that the interview and litigation process was necessarily 'harmful' to 
children."). 
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general rule, jurors tend to doubt a child's testimony.155 This belief 
conflicts with the opinions of researchers in the sexual abuse area that 
children rarely fabricate charges of sexual abuse. 156 Consequently, 
from the very beginning, jurors view children as less credible than 
adults. 
Second, several state courts have found this evidence to be prejudi-
cial. The Iowa Supreme Court, recognizing the danger of such evi-
dence, stated that prior sexual conduct evidence had a "substantial 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading of the jury, 
and invasion of the complainant's privacy which Rule 412 and other 
rape shield laws are designed to prevent."157 Likewise, the Michigan 
155. Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 36-37 ("The present study suggests that mock jurors 
are concerned that children may remember less than adults do and that children may be easily 
manipulated into giving false reports ..•. Our findings indicate that adults can have negative 
biases about the veracity of children's testimony."); see also A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Tres-
sillian Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in Ev AL-
U A TING WITNESS EVIDENCE 13, 35 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983) 
(finding that only 30% of adults surveyed believed that a child would be likely to respond accu-
rately to questioning by the police or in court); Duggan et al., supra note 34, at 92. In the 
Duggan article, the authors describe a study in which they conducted a series of simulated child 
sex abuse trials using child prosecuting witnesses of ages five, nine, and 13. They found that the 
nine-year-old prosecuting witness was more credible than the five-year-old witness, but the 13-
year-old witness was the least credible of the three. The authors attributed the 13-year-old's 
lesser credibility to a judgment by the jurors that a child of that age may be partly responsible for 
the occurrence of the sexual activity. 
156. Kathleen C. Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth?, 8 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 473, 475 (1984) ("Clinicians and researchers in the field of sexual abuse are 
in agreement that false allegations by children are extremely rare. Further in those unusual 
instances where they do occur, there is usually some serious malfunction in the family.") (foot-
note omitted); Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 154, at 127: 
While adults are often skeptical when children· report sexual abuse, especially by those in or 
close to the family, there is little or no evidence indicating that children's reports are unreli-
able, and none at all to support the fear that children often make false accusations of sexual 
assault or misunderstand innocent behavior by adults. The general veracity of children's 
reports is supported by relatively high rates of admission by the offenders. Not a single 
study has ever found false accusations of sexual assault a plausible interpretation of a sub-
stantial portion of cases. 
(citations omitted); BILLm W. DZIECH & CHARI.ES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL: AMERICA'S 
CoURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 57 (2d ed. 1991) (citing a 
number of studies which estimate fabrication rates to be from less than two percent up to eight 
percent, ascending with the age of the child, and summarizing that all researchers report that 
"false accusations are extremely rare."). Other researchers assert child abuse fabrication may be 
more common. See John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater 
Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1726 (1990) (review ofDZIECH & SCHUDSON, supra) (argu-
ing that Dziech and Schudson exaggerate the agreement among researchers by noting that two 
studies have found fabrication rates as high as 20% when the child's parents are embroiled in 
divorce litigation); HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 280 (1988) (citing statement by former director of National Center on Child 
Abuse and Neglect "that 65% of all reports of suspected child abuse tum out to be unfounded" 
and reasoning that although that percentage is based on child abuse in general, "there is no 
reason to assume that it is any different with reports of child sexual abuse."). But see Myers, 
supra, at 1712-13, 1716 (review ofW AKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra) (arguing that Wakefield 
and Underwager have forsaken their objectivity, that this "loss of objectivity finds repeated ex-
pression in their resort to exaggeration," and that their book is "a biased, inaccurate, and adver-
sarial indictment of efforts to respond to child sexual abuse"). 
157. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 1984). 
858 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:827 
Supreme Court has noted: 
[T]he potential prejudice from the admission of such evidence is 
great. First, in order for it to have minuscule probative value, it would 
have to refer not only to the existence of sexual conduct but also to the 
details of such conduct. To demonstrate a source of knowledge the de-
tails of such conduct would have to be compared to the details as 
presented at trial. There would be a real danger of misleading the 
jury.158 
Thus, these courts have noted the prejudicial qualities of prior sexual 
conduct evidence in child molestatic;m cases. 
Third, evidence of a prior molestation conveys much more infor-
mation to the jury than the sexual innocence inference theory de-
mands. The defendant ostensibly is arguing that the court should 
admit the evidence to show capacity to fabricate. Prior sexual conduct 
evidence, however, informs the jury that the child not only had the 
capacity to fabricate the charged conduct but that the child has in the 
past suffered through a traumatic experience, similar in nature to the 
one she now alleges. This added information, when coupled with ju-
rors' innate distrust of children's testimony, may convince them that 
such trauma has caused the child to suffer under a delusion that the 
prio~ molestation has continued into the present. Alternatively, the 
jury may believe that it is simply too much of a coincidence for one 
child to have suffered two sexual assaults and consequently decide that 
the child must be fabricating the second assault - the charged 
offense.159 
Thus a court must be wary in dealing with such evidence. It seems 
clear that jurors will tend to value prior sexual molestation evidence 
too highly because of the shocking nature of the evidence as well as the 
jurors' o~ prejudices regarding child witnesses. While this prejudi-
cial effect is significant, the prejudice is not sufficiently great to war-
rant categorical exclusion of all such evidence in child molestation 
158. People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982); see State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071 
(Ariz. 1988): 
Two of the policies underpinning [Arizona's court-created rape shield rule]-that requiring 
sex crime victims to defend every incident in their pasts will discourage prosecution and that 
the introduction of sexual histories might confuse the jury - are just as valid in a child 
molestation case as in a rape prosecution. In fact, child molestation victims may be even 
more adversely affected by unwarranted and unreasonable inquiry into largely collateral and 
irrelevant evidence than victims in rape cases. 
760 P.2d at 1076. 
159. Cf. v ALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING TIIE JURY 209 (1986) (noting a study 
which found that in simulated rape trials, when the victim's prior sexual conduct was admitted in 
evidence, the subject-jurors tended to believe that the victim consented to intercourse, judged the 
victim's character unfavorably, and believed the victim was in some way responsible for the 
rape); SAUL M. KAssIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 67 (1988) ("[J]udging the credibility of witnesses is often a mat-
ter of logic and common sense .... Based on what they learn of the witness's background, jurors 
determine whether he or she is the kind of person who could be trusted . • . . As they do in other 
areas of life, jurors make these kinds of judgments on the basis of what they know from personal 
experience and culturally transmitted knowledge."). 
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cases. Nevertheless, the prejudicial effect is large enough to require 
the defendant first to attempt to prove the child's capacity to fabricate 
through other, less prejudicial means. This use of an alternative 
means of proof falls within the concept of probative value. 
3. Assessing Probative Value 
Probative value is a more narrow concept than relevance. An evi-
dentiary item is relevant if it renders some material fact more or less 
probable. An item's probative value demonstrates how much more or 
less probable it renders a material fact. 160 The advisory note to Fed-
eral Rule 403 reveals other factors to be considered in balancing an 
item's probative value against its prejudicial effect: "Situations in this 
area call for balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence 
against the harm likely to result from its admission .... The availabil-
ity of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor." 161 The 
Advisory Committee's comment suggests the proper test: the judge 
must determine whether the evidence is necessary to rebut the sexual 
innocence inference, or whether other evidence in the case has success-
fully accomplished that. If there are alternative means of rebutting the 
sexual innocence inference that are not as prejudicial, the court may 
constitutionally exclude the prior sexual conduct evidence. 
Several courts have acknowledged situations in which no need for 
the evidence existed because other evidence in the case clearly showed 
that the child was sexually knowledgeable and thus capable of 
fabricating the offense. A Missouri court found that "[f]rom the 
State's own evidence the jury could infer that [the child] was sexually 
aware, and the evidence defendant was not permitted to introduce 
would have added very little."162 Likewise, an Oregon court found 
that the State itself had prevented any possible sexual innocence infer-
ence by presenting "evidence that children of the victim's age would 
have some knowledge about sexual matters."163 Thus, the judge 
should examine the evidence presented by the prosecution to see if it 
establishes that the child had the sexual knowledge necessary to fabri-
cate the charge.164 
The other consideration of the Advisory Committee that the judge 
must evaluate - and, as this Note argues, the most important - is 
whether there are alternative means of rebutting the sexual innocence 
inference that are not so prejudicial. Two commentators argue that 
160. Dolan, supra note 73, at 233-34. 
161. FEo. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note. 
162. State v. Weiler, 801S.W.2d417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 295 
(1991), ajfd., 827 S.W. 2d 291 (1992); see supra note 73. 
163. State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
164. For other examples of the exclusion of evidence because evidence previously admitted 
had effectively rebutted the sexual innocence inference, see supra notes 125-26. 
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the sexual innocence inference can and should always be rebutted by 
this method.165 Admitting prior sexual conduct evidence to rebut the 
sexual innocence inference "seems unnecessary inasmuch as the de-
fendant can easily rebut this inference by questions or evidence limited 
to the child's prior knowledge of sexual terminology or practices, as-
suming that the prosecutor would not be willing to stipulate that the 
child was not sexually innocent."166 The Michigan Supreme Court 
agrees: "Counsel could inquire whether the victim had any exper-
iences . . . which aided him or her in describing the conduct that is 
alleged." 167 
In the vast majority of cases, a judge could ensure that a defendant 
has an opportunity to prove the child's capacity to fabricate, without 
using prejudicial evidence, by simply requiring the defense attorney to 
ask questions about the child's sexual knowledge without making ref-
erence to the prejudicial source of that knowledge, the prior assault. 
Such questions do not offend the rape shield statute, which applies 
only to conduct; the opportunities to explore the basis for the child's 
knowledge also protects the defendant's cross-examination rights. 168 
For example, defense counsel could cross-examine about (a) whether 
the child had seen movies or books that could have supplied such sex-
ual knowledge; (b) whether the child had witnessed the sexual behav-
ior of others; (c) whether the child had acquired sexual knowledge in 
school, through either traditional sex education classes or through 
"good touch, bad touch" training provided by local law enforcement 
authorities; or (d) whether the child might have learned about sexual 
matters from conversations with friends or family members. 
Rarely should defense counsel be unable to prove to the jury 
through this method of questioning that the child had the sexual 
knowledge necessary to fabricate the offense.169 In fact, the prosecu-
tion, rather than risk prolonged cross-examination of the young wit-
ness, may wish to consider stipulating to the fact that the child 
possesses the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate the offense. 
Although conceding an important point, the prosecution prevents the 
jury from hearing the prior sexual conduct evidence, which, according 
to the evidentiary rationale analysis, is highly prejudicial because it 
conveys much more information than is necessary to establish capacity 
165. 23 WRIGlIT & GRAHAM, supra note 71, § 5387 (Supp. 1992). 
166. Id. 
167. People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982); see supra text accompanying note 
107. 
168. At least one court disagrees with such an approach. See State v. Baker, 508 A.2d 1059, 
1062 (N.H. 1986), discussed supra note 73. But the Constitution requires only that the defendant 
have an opportunity for effective cross-examination; a trial judge can adequately supervise the 
questioning until satisfied that the state of the child's sexual knowledge has been established. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 107 and 166. 
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to fabricate. 11° 
Thus, the judge_ should exclude the evidence if: 
(1) evidence in the case has effectively rebutted the inference; or 
(2) there are less prejudicial means of rebutting the sexual innocence 
inference, such as by asking the child about her sexual knowledge. 
If the state cannot satisfy either option, which would probably be a 
rare occurrence, the defendant's offer of proof would survive the rele-
vance and prejudice tests and thus its admission would be constitu-
tionally required under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 or state rape 
shield statutes modeled on that Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the sexual innocence inference theory raises some potent 
constitutional arguments on its behalf, the theory is simply a vehicle 
for placing highly prejudicial evidence before the jury in child molesta-
tion cases. The theory raises the concern that the jury may give undue 
credibility to the child's testimony by inferring that the child could not 
have possessed the capacity to describe the sexual assault unless the 
offense had actually occurred. The force behind this argument is the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to cross-
examine and challenge a witness's credibility. That force, however, 
simultaneously exposes its greatest weakness. 
Although the Supreme Court has always stressed the importance 
of cross-examination as the defendant's main exercise of his Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights, it also has stated that the defendant 
has no right to cross-examine in any way he sees fit. The defendant 
has no right to effective cross-examination; he has only the right to an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination. As long as the judge pro-
vides that opportunity, the defendant has received the full protection 
of the Sixth Amendment. The judge need not permit a prejudicial 
method of cross-examination when the defendant can achieve the 
same effect by another, less prejudicial method. 
Any framework for the analysis of sexual innocence inference situ-
ations must ensure that the defendant has the opportunity to show 
that the child had the capacity to fabricate the offense, if such evidence 
exists, while also protecting the child and the State from the highly 
prejudicial effect of evidence of prior molestations. Consequently, 
before the judge admits prior sexual conduct evidence, he or she 
should examine the evidence to see if it meets these four requirements: 
(1) The child must be young enough at the time of trial such that the 
jury might infer that the child could not have possessed the requisite 
170. See. e.g., State v. Weeks, 782 P.2d 430 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). In Weeks, the prosecution 
offered to stipulate that "children of the victims' ages would have some knowledge of sexual 
matters." 782 P.2d at 432 n.2. The court stated that this offer showed that the prosecution was 
not trying to assert the children's sexual innocence before the assault. 782 P.2d at 432 n.2. 
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sexual knowledge to describe the offense, unless the defendant had com-
mitted the offense. As an initial presumption subject to rebuttal, a court 
could reasonably assume that the jury will make the sexual innocence 
inference when the child is twelve years old or younger at the time of 
trial. 
(2) The prior sexual conduct must be sufficiently similar to the 
charged offense such that experiencing the prior incident would give the 
child the specific knowledge necessary to be able to fabricate the charged 
offense. 
(3) Other evidence admitted in the trial must fail to prove effectively 
that the child had the capacity to fabricate the offense. 
( 4) There must be no other less prejudicial means available to de-
fense counsel to show that the child had the capacity to fabricate the 
offense. 
If, after applying this framework, 171 the trial judge remains uncon-
vinced that the sexual innocence inference has been rebutted, the de-
fendant has met his burden and the prior sexual conduct evidence, at 
this point constitutionally required, must be admitted. 
Some maintain that a defendant should not have to follow such a 
circuitous route of cross-examination to establish a point that the prior 
sexual conduct evidence makes so forcefully. 112 This view, however, 
fails to recognize that the evidence's prejudicial nature is precisely 
what makes it so "effective." When prior sexual conduct evidence is 
introduced, not only does the evidence effectively rebut the sexual in-
nocence inference, it also plants a prejudicial seed in a juror's mind: 
the idea that a previous victim of molestation, due to the obvious emo-
tional and mental trauma involved, has become prone to lie and fabri-
cate other incidents of molestation. The defendant thus gamers a 
double benefit from the evidence: he rebuts the sexual innocence infer-
ence and unfairly prejudices the jury against the child. Proper appli-
cation of the above framework will protect effectively the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine while ensuring the fair oper-
ation of the jurisdiction's rape shield statute. 
171. At least one court followed a similar approach in dealing with an analogous issue. In 
Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the defendant sought to introduce 
the prior sexual conduct of the child to show the child's motive to make a false accusation. The 
court held that to circumvent the state's rape shield statute prohibiting such evidence, the de-
fendant must show: "(1) whether the proposed evidence is relevant to show bias or motive or to 
attack credibility; (2) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; 
and (3) whether there are alternative means of proving bias or motive or to challenge credibility." 
487 A.2d at 401. 
172. See State v. Baker, 508 A.2d 1059, 1062 (N.H. 1986); supra note 168 and accompanying 
text. 
